Non-tariff Measures and Productivity of Ukrainian Food Processing Firms by Movchan, Veronika et al.
J Agric Econ. 2021;00:1–23.   | 1wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jage
Received: 16 November 2020 | Revised: 21 April 2021 | Accepted: 28 May 2021
DOI: 10.1111/1477-9552.12451  
O R I G I N A L  A R T I C L E
Non- tariff measures and productivity of Ukrainian 
food- processing firms
Oleksandr Shepotylo1  |    Volodymyr Vakhitov2 |    Veronika Movchan3 |   
Mariia Panga4
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creat ive Commo ns Attri butio n- NonCo mmerc ial- NoDerivs License, which 
permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non- commercial and no 
modifications or adaptations are made.
© 2021 The Authors. Journal of Agricultural Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Agricultural Economics 
Society
1Aston University, Birmingham, UK
2Kyiv School of Economics, Kyiv, Ukraine
3Institute for Economic Research and Policy 
Consulting, Kyiv, Ukraine
4National Bank of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine
Correspondence




Norges Forskningsråd, Grant/Award 
Number: 216742/O10
Abstract
Using detailed data on veterinary, ecological, sanitary, 
phytosanitary and mandatory certification measures, this 
paper studies the effect of non- tariff measures (NTMs) on 
firm productivity in the food- processing industry through 
forward and backward linkages. Using quantity and 
value of output at product level, we calculate and com-
pare quantity- and revenue- based measures of total factor 
productivity (TFP). Exploiting the episode of NTM lib-
eralisation in Ukraine in 2008– 2012, we find that NTMs 
on intermediate inputs have a negative effect on quantity- 
based TFP. Other trade policy variables, including input 
tariffs and output NTMs also negatively influence pro-
ductivity. The effect on the revenue- based TFP is weaker 
due to price and quality adjustments. Interacting changes 
in input NTMs with import intensity prior to trade lib-
eralisation, we find that firms that used imported inputs 
more intensively tend to have lower long- run TFP growth.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Non- tariff measures (NTMs) have always been an essential part of the trade policy toolbox. 
However, because of substantial multilateral tariff reductions, they have replaced tariffs as 
the primary trade policy tools effects (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2016). Growing public concerns 
about health and food safety have stimulated governments around the world to regulate food 
quality and safety by means of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, product licensing 
and certification, and technical barriers to trade (TBT).
However, there are concerns that NTMs are protectionism in disguise, curbing product 
variety and making goods more expensive.1 The introduction of NTMs may lead to a reduction 
in within- firm productivity by limiting the set of available intermediate inputs, equipment and 
technologies. The mechanism of the productivity decline works through the backward or for-
ward linkages. The backward linkages cause a reduction in input variety as in Ethier (1982) or 
reduce the feasibility of certain ingredients or technologies, which leads to a less efficient mix 
of inputs. The productivity decline may also arise from forward linkages in the form of a lack 
of competition in the good's final markets, resulting in X- inefficiency (Corden, 1974) and scale 
effects (Helpman & Krugman, 1985; Krugman, 1979).
This paper investigates the effect of NTMs on within- firm productivity in the food- 
processing industry through the forward and backward linkages. The positive effects of trade 
liberalisation (mostly measured by import tariff reduction) on productivity have already been 
established (Amiti & Konings, 2007; Halpern et al., 2015; Kasahara & Rodrigue, 2008; 
Khandelwal & Topalova, 2011). The reduction in output tariffs has also been shown to have a 
positive, but weaker and less robust effect on productivity (Amiti & Konings, 2007; Pavcnik, 
2002). In the food industry, greater competition in imported intermediate inputs boosts the 
productivity of food producers (Olper et al., 2017). However, little is known about how produc-
tivity is influenced by NTMs. It is important that this knowledge gap be filled because of the 
increasing rates of NTM protection, which are high compared to the most favoured nation 
(MFN) tariff rates. For example, in 2004, the average import- weighted ad valorem equivalent 
of NTMs was 10%, while the average import weighted ad valorem tariff was only 3.7% and by 
2017 declined to 2.6%.2 NTMs have also become more prominent due to their more frequent 
use (WTO, 2012), a shift that goes against the trend for multilateral and regional tariff 
liberalisation.
For several reasons, it is somewhat challenging to analyse the effect of an NTM, 
especially for food products. First, its opposite impacts on the demand and supply sides 
mean that it is a priori ambiguous. From the demand side, stricter regulations send a sig-
nal to consumers about the higher quality and safety of food products, which could stim-
ulate consumer demand. This demand shock, if not appropriately controlled for, would 
increase the revenue- based measure of TFP, falsely signalling increased productivity (De 
Loecker et al., 2016; Foster et al., 2008; Kugler & Verhoogen, 2012). From the supply side, 
NTMs may reduce foreign competition and restrict access to imported inputs. However, 
they may also induce firms to improve quality (Bas & Strauss- Kahn, 2015; Curzi et al., 
2015; Fan et al., 2015b; Hallak & Sivadasan, 2013; Halpern et al., 2015) with ambiguous 
implications for firm and industry performance. It is also challenging to study the effect 
of NTMs due to the difficulties of obtaining reliable and accurate measures (Goldberg & 
Pavcnik, 2016).
 1See Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2011) for a political economy model of food standards.
 2The ad valorem equivalents of non- tariff barriers are estimated by Looi Kee et al. (2009). Data on ad valorem applied tariffs are 
from the World Bank.
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The literature on NTMs is mostly focused on their effects on trade, typically finding a 
negative overall effect (Disdier et al., 2008; Otsuki et al., 2001).3 The effect is heterogeneous 
along various degrees of aggregation and margins of trade, including at the product level, 
the firm level and the country level (Fiankor et al., 2020). Crivelli and Gröschl (2016) find 
a negative impact of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures on the extensive margins 
of trade, but positive on the intensive margins. Looking at the Peruvian food industry 
firms, Curzi et al. (2020) find that NTMs significantly limit exports at extensive and 
intensive margins. Movchan et al. (2020) find that for Ukrainian food industry firms 
NTMs in upstream industries lead to higher export prices and higher quality of exported 
food products. The effect of NTMs on exports depends on the absorptive capacity of 
firms. Anders and Caswell (2009), investigating the effect of a Hazard Analysis Critical 
Control Points (HACCP) food safety standard on seafood imports, find a negative trade 
effect for developing countries and a positive effect for developed countries. The literature 
also documents an ambiguous effect on consumers and producers. Xiong and Beghin 
(2014) disentangle the effects of a specific NTM, a maximum residue level (MRL), to 
confirm that the demand effect of food safety on exporting is positive whereas the sup-
ply  side effect is negative. Moreover, exporters from developing countries are more im-
pacted by the MRL. Beghin et al., (2015) further find that NTMs have a trade- facilitating 
effect on a large number of products. Finally, there is a stream of literature that empha-
sises the benefits of NTM harmonisation across countries. For instance, Chen and Mattoo 
(2008) document that regional agreements that harmonise NTMs are beneficial for 
bilateral trade.
Our analysis is focused on the impact of domestic NTMs on the productivity of do-
mestic firms. This question is important for policy- makers who have a direct influence on 
domestic NTM regulations and are tasked with drawing on a wide variety of NTM tools to 
design the optimal policy. Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it 
identifies a causal impact of NTMs on productivity by exploiting as a source of exogenous 
variation the 2008– 2012 episode of NTM liberalisation following Ukraine's WTO acces-
sion. Second, it improves on the measurement of NTMs, which are recorded from legal 
texts at the most disaggregated level and capture the period of very important changes in 
the approach to non- tariff measures, when Ukraine decided to move away from the Soviet 
system of mandatory standards and quality control (GOST) to the modern WTO system, 
which is also compatible with the European Union (EU) standards. We use a unique data-
set of Ukrainian NTMs, which directly records veterinary, sanitary, phytosanitary, ecol-
ogy controls and mandatory certifications from the Ukrainian legal texts at the 10- digit 
classification of product lines. These measures are applied to imported goods by the cus-
toms border control system. We combine the NTM data with the product- level data for 
the Ukrainian food producers (NACE 1.1 Section 15: Manufacture of food products and 
beverages). We also incorporate recent advances in the literature on production function 
estimation and demonstrate that separating demand and supply shocks is very important 
for the analysis of the impact of policy on productivity. We observe both the prices and 
quantities of output; hence, we are able to separate the productivity effects of NTMs from 
their demand side effects. Using an approach similar to De Loecker et al. (2016), we com-
pute and contrast productivity measures based on revenue- and quantity- based production 
function estimations. Third, we consider both the average effect of all types of NTM and 
the effects of NTM components, including sanitary, phytosanitary, veterinary, ecologi-
cal and mandatory certification measures that are imposed against upstream inputs and 
downstream outputs.
 3See also Santeramo and Lamonaca’s (2019) meta- analysis of studies on the impact of NTMs in agri- food trade.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses changes in NTMs in 
Ukraine in 2007– 2013. Section 3 introduces a model. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 
discusses our empirical methodology. In particular, it shows TFP estimation and construction 
of input and output NTMs. Section 6 presents the main results. Section 7 concludes.
2 |  NON- TARI FF M EASU RES
2.1 | Mechanisms of NTM impact on productivity
The mechanisms of the impact of NTMs on firms are broader than the mechanisms of the 
impact of tariffs. Akin to tariffs, NTMs influence the importing of goods in upstream and 
downstream industries at extensive and intensive margins by increasing the fixed and vari-
able trade costs. These include the costs of compliance with the regulations at the production 
stage, the costs of monitoring and verifying the compliance, and the costs of inspections at 
the border. In the downstream industries, elimination of NTMs would increase competi-
tion, leading to the Melitz selection mechanism (Melitz, 2003) at extensive margins, a more 
efficient allocation of resources due to the expansion of more productive firms, a reduction 
in operational slack, and X- efficiency gains. In the upstream industries, abolishing NTMs 
would result in lower costs and a wider variety of inputs available to the local firms. This 
would increase within- firm productivity due to a more expansive range of imperfect input 
substitutes, learning by importing, and lower cost per unit of quality. However, the quality 
of inputs may potentially be lower.
In addition, NTMs may ban certain technologies and ingredients, such as chlorinated 
chickens, antibiotics in meat, and products that contain genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs). In this way, NTMs are similar to import quotas and import prohibitions in that 
they directly regulate the quantity of certain inputs, inducing firms to choose the optimal 
input mix under an additional set of constraints. Importantly, these measures not only in-
fluence the cost of production but also set requirements for the quality of the final goods, 
and these higher health and safety standards may in turn positively impact consumer de-
mand. Therefore, NTMs may simultaneously shift supply and demand curves in the up-
stream industries.
To conclude, productivity gains may emerge from liberalising NTMs because of the tighter 
competition in final goods, greater variety in intermediate imports, learning from importing, 
and scale effects. However, it also may result in lower demand for the final output, due to lower 
standards for quality and health.
2.2 | NTM liberalisation in Ukraine
In the study, we focus on the transformation of Ukraine's NTMs during 2007– 2013, that 
is, starting the year before Ukraine joined the WTO, to analyse the changes that occurred 
after the country joined this international organisation. This period embraces the results of 
almost two decades of reform efforts aimed at replacing the old Soviet system of mandatory 
standards (GOSTs) with the WTO- compatible system of product safety controls. To measure 
NTMs and document the process of liberalisation, we use a unique database of Ukrainian 
NTMs in 2007– 2013. It contains information on NTMs designed to safeguard the lives and 
health of people, animals, and plants. More precisely, we focus on five types of controls:
• Veterinary control aimed at preventing the spread of animal- origin diseases;
• Phytosanitary control aimed at preventing the spread of pests and plant diseases;
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• Sanitary and epidemiological control aimed at preventing the spread of infectious diseases 
and testing the compliance of sanitary rules with the ultimate goal of protecting people's 
lives;
• Ecological control aimed at protecting the environment;
• Mandatory certification aimed at testing compliance with mandatory standards that, in 
their turn, are aimed at protecting the lives and health of people, ensuring technical compat-
ibility, controlling labour safety, and so on.
These types of controls have been specified through a variety of legislation and are imple-
mented by different state agencies. NTM provisions are taken directly from Ukrainian legal 
texts. Table A2 in the Online Appendix identifies the legal sources. Data is collected at the 
10- digit classification of product lines (TS10) and by different types of NTMs. At the product- 
type level, an observation is coded as a binary variable, taking the value of 1 if type k NTM 
is applied and 0 otherwise. Data are aggregated at the level of HS 6- digit product lines, as the 
share of lines with NTMs, thus:
where k = {Veter, Ecol, Sanit, Phyto, Cert}, NTMk
HS10,t
 is a binary NTM indicator at 10- digit 
level and NHS6is the number of TS10- digit lines within an HS 6- digit category. This measure of 
NTMs is called a frequency of NTM index. Its advantage is simplicity and comprehensive cover-
age of all product lines. Its disadvantage is that it does not differentiate NTMs by their stringency. 
However, given the frequency indicator, the stringency can be inferred by looking at its impact on 
variables of interest, such as productivity, trade or quality.
To combine trade data with firm- level data on productivity and size, we use the HS to 
ISIC and ISIC to NACE concordances available from the World Integrated Trade Solutions 
(WITS) website and the Eurostat/RAMON service. We aggregate NTM measures to the level 
of NACE1.1 3- digit food sub- industries, computing the simple averages of all the HS 10- digit 
NTMs. There were almost no changes in the NTM legislation prior to 2008. Therefore, we 
take 2007 as a pre- liberalisation starting point, being the last year before the episode of trade 
liberalisation.
Despite the fact that NTMs should be equally applied to local and foreign producers, these 
measures are a part of the customs border control system and are therefore applied only on 
imported goods.4
Figure A1 in the Online Appendix illustrates the frequency index of Ukraine's NTMs in 
2007– 2013. It clearly highlights one of the key problems of the old system: the excessive dupli-
cation of controls, thereby amplifying the control functions of the state agencies. In 2007, most 
of the food industry's subsectors faced duplication of controls, whereas by 2013 the controls 
had been streamlined and duplication reduced. In particular, in line with Ukraine's WTO 
commitments, the mandatory certification of food products was gradually eliminated, while 
the task of ensuring food safety was placed under sanitary and, if relevant, veterinary con-
trols. This change was especially pertinent to beverages, dairy and fish products, fruits and 
vegetables, and oils and fats. Other types of control were also streamlined, with the most vis-
ible change being experienced by the prepared animal feed sector, where only veterinary con-
trol remained. For more detailed information by different food sub- industries, please refer to 








 4In theory, the same standards are applied to local producers. However, it is highly unlikely that domestic controlling authorities 
follow procedures that are as strict as those of the customs border controls, and even if this were the case, importers are subject to 
double regulations— within their home country and in Ukraine. This imposes additional costs on importers.
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These changes allowed a reduction in the total number of NTMs that applied to Ukraine's 
food sector. However, the duplication of controls was not completely removed. For example, 
many animal origin products (meat, fish, dairy) are subject to both veterinary and sanitary 
controls, while for grain, mill and starch products, sanitary and phytosanitary controls are 
only partially duplicated.
3 |  TH EORETICA L FRA M EWOR K
3.1 | Productivity and imported intermediate inputs
Consider a firm with a Cobb– Douglas production function Q = ΦQK
K LLMM, where ΦQ is 
the total factor productivity, which is ex ante exogenous to the firm and randomly drawn from 
an ex ante known distribution after paying an entry fixed cost; K  is capital; L is employment; 
and M is aggregate intermediate input. K  is predetermined, while L and M are variable inputs 
chosen conditionally on Φ. We also assume that K + L + M = 1.
The firm operates in a small open economy, taking input prices as given. The final 
good industry is monopolistically competitive, with each firm producing a distinct variety. 
Intermediate inputs can be sourced domestically or imported and are combined into the ag-
gregate intermediate input
where 0 < 𝜌 < 1. Inputs are horizontally and vertically differentiated. Horizontally differentiated 
input varieties are imperfect substitutes with elasticity of substitution 𝜎M > 1, which is related to 
 as given by M = 1∕(1 − ). J is a set of domestic varieties and J
∗ is a set of imported varieties. 
x and x ∗ are quantities of domestic and imported inputs. Inputs are also vertically differentiated. 
Λ(j) ≥ 1 is a measure of input quality. We assume that domestic inputs are of the same baseline 
quality Λ(j) = 1 ∀ j ∈ J, and that the marginal cost of producing one unit of intermediate input 
of the baseline quality is 1. Imported inputs vary in quality and are subject to non- tariff (NTM) 
and tariff (t) regulations. Policy function (NTM , t) ≥ 1 describes the cost that trade policy im-
poses on imported intermediate inputs with 𝜕𝜏
𝜕NTM
> 0 and 𝜕𝜏
𝜕t
> 0. Assuming the input markets are 
perfectly competitive, p∗ (j) = Λ(j) × (NTM(j), t(j)) is the price of a unit of intermediate foreign 
input, while pD = 1 is the price of a unit of domestic intermediate input.
Motivated by the fact that not all domestic firms use imported inputs and often switch im-
port status in and out (Halpern et al., 2015), we assume that importing requires paying a fixed 
cost, which incrementally increases with the number of imported inputs. Thus, importing j 
inputs requires paying F = j × f , which is due every period. We also assume that domestic va-
rieties do not require the payment of these fixed costs.
Suppose that the mass of domestic and foreign intermediate inputs used by a firm are n and 
n∗, respectively.5 In equilibrium, any firm at any ex ante productivity level uses all domestic 
inputs: n = J. We consider a symmetric case where all imported inputs are of the same quality 
Λ and have the same price p∗
m
. The extensive margin of imports, n∗ ≤ J ∗, depends on the pro-
ductivity level. Consequently, for a firm that uses only domestic inputs, M = J1∕ × x and for 
an importing firm, M = (J + Λn∗ )1∕ x. An importing firm would have a productivity advan-
tage over a firm with the same productivity level that uses only domestic inputs. A firm that 




 dj + ∫j∈J∗
[




 5We suppress the firm index for clarity of presentation.
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For an importing firm, and ignoring the fixed costs of importing, total factor productivity 
is given by:
A number of imported inputs n∗ is further determined as follows:
where (. ) is the one- period profit of a firm with the initial productivity draw ΦQ, subject to trade 
policy NTM(j), t(j). j is the number of imported intermediate inputs.
Importantly, since the profit function increases in ex ante productivity, there is an import 
productivity threshold Φ̃Q, such that n
∗ (Φ̃Q) = 1 and n
∗ (ΦQ) = 0 ∀ΦQ < Φ̃Q. The productiv-
ity advantage of an importer with ex ante exogenous productivity draw Φ1
Q
> Φ̃Q over a non- 
importer with productivity Φ0
Q
< Φ̃Q would arise from three sources: (i) self- selection due to 
the initial exogenous productivity draw, (ii) a greater variety of intermediate inputs, and (iii) a 
better quality of imported inputs:
3.2 | Marginal cost and NTMs
We do not observe the quality of inputs in our sample. However, we can use information about 
the material costs to account for it. Solving the cost minimisation problem for intermediate 
inputs yields the following optimal inputs:
and
where the unit cost of input M is given by the following price index:
An importing firm has a productivity advantage over a company with the same ex ante ex-
ogenous productivity Φ that does not import intermediate inputs as long as the input markets 
are perfectly competitive and 𝜏 > 1:







= ΦQ × (n + Λ
 × n∗ )
M∕
n∗ (ΦQ,NTM(j), t(j)) = arg max
j
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This advantage increases with lower  and also with a larger number of importer inputs, 
n∗. Therefore, the model predicts that introducing non- tariff measures on imported inputs 
increases the marginal cost of production and lowers the productivity of an importing firm. 
If quality Λ(j) differs across importers and the NTM imposes a minimum quality standard 
such as Λ ≥ ΛMIN, NTMs would also limit the number of importers 𝜕n∗ (Λmin)∕𝜕Λmin < 0, which 
would similarly reduce productivity.
Our model assumes that the prices of intermediate inputs fully reflect quality and trade 
costs since the input markets are perfectly competitive. If we relax this assumption, we may 
observe that importers do not have a cost advantage as long as n∗ is low and 
p∗ (j)?Λ(j) × (NTM(j), t(j)).6 Both are more likely when the domestic economy has high trade 
barriers, which leads to monopolised intermediate input markets with fewer competitors. For 
two sources of heterogeneity— productivity and quality— this would also depend on the trade- 
off between the quality- sorting versus efficiency- sorting (see Manova and Zhang, 2012, for 
stylised facts and Fan et al., 2015a, for an application).
4 |  DATA
The data for the project come from several sources. To obtain the dependent variable, total 
factor productivity (TFP), we used the statistical statements of commercial firms in 2002– 
2013 (TFP sample), available from the State Statistical Service of Ukraine (Ukrstat). In par-
ticular, Financial Results Statements provide data on revenues less indirect taxes, which is a 
revenue- based measure of output, and material costs, which is a measure of the cost of inputs. 
The Balance Sheet statements provide the value of fixed assets, our capital measure. Full- 
time employment equivalent, our labour measure, is also from the Balance Sheet statements. 
Investments in fixed assets were taken from the Enterprise Performance Statements. It should 
be noted that the requirement to provide all this information to Ukrstat is only mandatory for 
relatively large firms; after 2012, the reporting from small firms was simplified in that they do 
not have to include information on material costs and investments. To deal with this problem, 
we restrict the sample to only firms with at least 10 employees and positive values of output 
and capital.
The revenue- based output measure was deflated by a two- digit sector deflator of manufac-
turing output, whereas material costs, investments and capital measures were deflated by the 
PPI index, both of which were acquired from Ukrstat. These data are used to obtain the 
revenue- based estimates of TFP. We then draw on detailed annual statements of firm- level 
manufacturing output by product groups with Classification of Products by Activity (CPA) at 
the six- digit level. These statements contain information on quantities and prices, from which 
we calculate firm- level output price, P, which is used to compute firm output Q = R∕P where 
R is the revenue- based output. We use lnQ as the dependent variable to estimate the quantity- 
based production function from which we calculate the quantity- based TFP. Computing P is 
straightforward for firms that produce only one variety of product, which we call mono- 
product firms. For multiproduct firms, which produce many different outputs, a CES price 
index was computed (see the next section for a more detailed discussion of this). The process of 
price determination involves dropping extremely high and low values on the understanding 
that aggregation at the level of six digits covers substantial heterogeneity between physical 
outputs.7
 6For instance, there is evidence of less than 100% pass- through of lower tariffs on prices De Loecker et al. (2016).
 7We dropped 4540 prices that were below 5th and above 95th percentiles of price distributions in each year.
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To analyse the effect of NTM on productivity we look only at the period of 2007– 2013 
(NTM sample) because there is no variation in NTMs prior to 2007. The input requirements 
for each food sub- industry was taken from 2005 Input- Output tables.8 We also use correspon-
dence tables between HS and NACE1.1 classification, available from Eurostat/RAMON ser-
vice, to discover the input requirements for each sector.9 Another important explanatory 
variable, the measure of most favoured nation (MFN) tariff, is taken directly from the World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database, hosted by the World Bank.
The main data set is combined with the Customs data to extract the importer/exporter sta-
tus of each firm. Table 1 presents the summary statistics. Overall, the number of firms in our 
NTM sample decreased from about 1900 in 2007 to 1200 in 2013. During the 2007– 2013 period, 
an average firm almost doubled its output, capital and material cost without a noticeable in-
crease in employment. The food- processing industry became more open, with an increase in 
the share of exporting firms from 30% to 43%, and an increase in the share of importing firms 
from 27% to 39%.
5 |  M ETHODOLOGY
The empirical strategy proceeds in two stages. First, TFP is computed based on the production 
function estimation. Second, TFP estimates are regressed on measures of NTM intensities and 
controls.
5.1 | Revenue- based and quantity- based estimates of productivity
Foster et al. (2008) identified a common problem in empirical research when the productivity es-
timation is based on revenue R = P ×Q. The standard procedure of estimating the revenue- based 
production function leads to TFP capturing confounding effects of prices, quality and quantity. 
When a researcher has observations on both prices and quantities of output, it is possible to esti-
mate the production function based on physical outputs. However, there is a problem with aggre-
gation when a firm produces multiple outputs. De Loecker et al. (2016) developed a methodology 
for estimating the productivity of firms when the quantities and prices of outputs are observed but 
the allocation of inputs across different outputs is unknown. In particular, they suggest estimating 
a production function based on a sample of mono- product firms. An alternative strategy would 
be to compute a firm- level aggregate output and price index. This aggregate firm- level output can 
be used as the dependent variable in the estimation of the production function.
We implement estimation of the production function for both mono- and multi- product 
firms. We do the latter to ensure that the mono- firm sample does not introduce a selection 
bias into our later analysis. We also report and contrast the results for revenue- and output- 
based productivity estimates. A quantity- based production function for a firm i from food 
sub- industry j at time t is given by:
which differs from the revenue- based production function:
 8In 2005, the extended IO tables were issued by Ukrstat, which covered 52 tradable goods sub- industries and 80 sub- industries in 
total. The 2005 IO table is available at http://www.ukrst at.gov.ua/opera tiv/opera tiv20 09/vvp/an_tvv/IOT05 exp.rar
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For mono- product firms, estimating the quantity- based production function is straight-
forward because we have the data on the quantity of output in kilograms. Now, consider a 
multi- product firm with the set of outputs and prices {pi , qi}, i = 1, . . . ,N. The firm produces 





.10 We further define the quantity of output for a multi- product firm as Q = R∕P.
Note that the theory- based measure of material cost in equaiton (2) differs from the 
empirical measure, which is the total expenditures on goods and services in thousands of 
Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH) deflated by the common production price deflator, PM. First, it 
is not a purely quantity- based measure since M̃ = PMM∕PM. Second, it does not capture the 
variety and quality of inputs as long as the price of inputs does not fully reflect quality and 
trade costs.
5.2 | Estimation of production function and TFP
We define the food industry as all firms reporting their main economic activity to be the man-
ufacture of food products and beverages (NACE1.1 Section 15). Total factor productivity is 
estimated separately for each 3- digit NACE1.1 group, which we refer to as the nine food sub- 
industries (thus, the meat sub- industry, fish sub- industry, etc.)
Table 2 presents point estimates of the coefficients of production functions estimated ac-
cording to Levinsohn and Petrin (2003; henceforth LP), with material cost as a proxy for pro-
ductivity on both the full sample (Panel A) and on the sample of mono- product firms alone 
(Panel B).10 The coefficients of the revenue- based production function are reported to the left 
of the table, while the coefficients of the quantity- based production function are reported to 
the right of the table.11
We compute TFP, using the quantity- based coefficients estimated on the sample of mono- 
product firms as the baseline results. The quantity- based TFP (QTFP) is computed as given by
The revenue- based TFP (RTFP) is calculated as given by:
We further compute sub- industry level QTFP and RTFP, by calculating output- weighted 
averages by each food sub- industry and year. Figure A2 in the Online Appendix shows the 






 10We take σ = 5 for our main result, as is common in the literature (Head and Mayer, 2014). We also perform robustness checks 
with other values of σ, which do not alter our conclusions. The results are available upon request.
 10We implement LP using STATA command prodest (Rovigatti and Mollisi, 2018).
 11We also have estimated total factor productivity (TFP) using the Olley- Pakes (OP) method (Olley and Pakes, 1996), Ackerberg- 
Caves- Frazer (ACF) method (Ackerberg et al., 2015), and ACF with material cost as the proxy for productivity (ACF LP). These 
alternative TFPs are used for robustness checks.
(7)lnΦQ,ijt = lnQit − ̂
j
K
× lnKit − ̂
j
L




(8)lnΦR,ijt = lnRit − ̂
j
K
× lnKit − ̂
j
L
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by food sub- industry in 2007– 2013, when the average productivity growth was 4.4% per year. 
Fruit and vegetables, meat and fish products were among the sub- industries with the fast-
est productivity growth, and dairy products, prepared animal feeds had slower productivity 
growth, whereas productivity in other product goods declined over 2007– 2013.
5.3 | Trade protection measures
5.3.1 | Input NTMs and tariffs
As is standard in the literature (Amiti & Konings, 2007), we calculate input NTMs and 
input MFN tariffs at the sub- industry level. These vary across sub- industries and over time 
but are common to all firms within the sub- industry. The underlying assumption is that 
all firms within a food sub- industry use similar technologies and require similar inputs; 
hence, they are subject to the same regulatory policy that, from the firm's viewpoint, is ex-
ogenous. At the same time, we exploit an important dimension of heterogeneity across firms 
that is related to their productivity, which is the fact that some firms use imported inputs 
whereas others use local inputs. This reflects endogenous decision- making due to firm- level 
heterogeneity.
Input NTM of typek, where k = Veter, Ecol ,Sanit, Phyto, Certand input MFN tariff in 
food sub- industry jat time tare computed as
and
where m refers to industry which output is used as input in food sub- industry j production, NTMk
mt
is a share of HS6 product lines within the sub- industry mthat are covered by NTM of type kat time 


















TA B L E  3  Productivity growth in food industry in Ukraine, 2007– 2013
Year
Industry 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Meat products 1.6 25.6 −14.3 −4.4 4.7 4.8 35.1 10.7
Fish products 6.7 11.2 −0.4 −0.8 1 2.9 39.5 10.2
Fruit and vegetables 39.9 1.7 −19.3 7.6 4.6 20.2 18.8 11.6
Vegetable and animal oils and fats −70.7 38.8 40.3 −30.2 6 14.8 15.4 7.2
Dairy products −10.8 15.6 −2.4 −3 3.5 14 −0.7 2.8
Grain, mill products, starch products 3.7 7.9 1.9 0.1 3.8 3.6 12.7 4.9
Prepared animal feeds −8.2 18.2 8.7 −5.4 −1.8 −6.8 7.2 0.8
Other food products −31.7 8.3 5.1 1.8 5.7 −17.6 −5.6 −4.5
Beverages 1.5 4.3 −0.2 1.2 2.9 31.6 −5.6 6.4
Total −12.9 16 6.8 −6.7 4.3 9.6 7 4.4
Growth rates in percent are computed as an output weighted average TFP growth. TFP is calculated based on the production 
function estimates for the quantity- based sample of mono- product firms using Levinsohn and Petrin’s (2003) method.
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sub- industry mat time t.13w2005
jm
is a coefficient from the Ukrainian 2005 Input- Output table, which 
measures the share of the value of inputs from sub- industry m into the total inputs of sub- industry 
j.14 We also construct the average input NTM protection index as given by:
which captures the average level of input NTM protection and allows us to evaluate the overall 
effect of NTMs on productivity.
Figure A3 in the Online Appendix presents dynamics of input NTMs by food sub- 
industries in 2007– 2013. Sanitary measures dominated all food sub- industries starting in 
2008. Veterinary controls were widely present for fish products and to a lesser extent for meat 
products. There was a rapid decline in the use of mandatory certifications and a general trend 
in the reduction of MFN tariffs.
5.3.2 | Output NTM and tariffs
We also construct industry- level indices of NTM and tariff protection for outputs by comput-
ing simple averages of NTM frequencies and MFN tariffs as follows:
and
where Nj is the number of HS 6- digit product lines in the output of the sub- industry j. The map-
ping of HS 6- digit product lines into NACE1.1 sub- industries is performed using WITS corre-
spondences tables. These indices measure the level of protection of firms in industry j against 
foreign competition. We also construct the overall output NTM protection index as given by:
5.4 | Empirical specification
To investigate the effects of NTM liberalisation in 2007– 2013 on firm productivity, we consider 
the following parametric specification:
 13The mapping of HS 6- digit codes into NACE1.1 3- digit sub- industries is performed using consequent mappings of HS 6- digit 
codes into ISIC Rev.3 industries (available on World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) website) and further mapping of ISIC 
Rev.3 into NACE1.1 sub- industries.
 14The 2005 Input- Output table is the most detailed IO table available from the Ukrstat. 2005 weights precede the episode of 
changes in NTMs, so it does not cause endogeneity concerns. The source of variation in the NTM measure is the product- level 
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where firm i is from food sub- industry j. TFPijt is firm i's measure of productivity at time t. TFP 
is estimated by LP, but we also considered other methods, which generated the results described 
in the robustness section. inNTMk
jt
 is either the average or one of the five specific measures of 
input NTM protection in industry j at time t. We control for input tariffs ln(1 + tin
jt
), as another 
form of protection against imported inputs. We also control for levels of industry protection 
using our output NTM and output tariff measures. impit and expit are binary variables taking 
values of 1 if a firm i imported or exported in year t and 0 otherwise. The interaction term 
ln(1 + inNTMk
jt
) × impit is one of the variables of interest. A significant and negative 3 would 
suggest that importing firms are less productive due to more stringent NTMs. We also control 
for the firm size, with the natural log of employment. The error term has four components. 
First, the firm- specific term i captures unobservable time invariant characteristics, such as 
random productivity draw à la Melitz, which does not depend on policy changes and economic 
shocks. Second, time effect t captures macroeconomic shocks, such as the 2008– 2009 financial 
crisis. The timing of this crisis coincided with the WTO accession of Ukraine, which makes it 
particularly difficult to disentangle the two effects. Third, we include a sub- industry fixed ef-
fect to capture differences in the productivity measures across sub- industries. These arise from 
the use of different units to measure output (e.g., tons in the meat sub- industry and litres in the 
beverages sub- industry). Since the sample firms can change the industry, it is possible to control 
for both firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects. Finally, an idiosyncratic error term it is 
iid : (0, 2
i
).
6 |  RESU LTS
6.1 | Main results: Aggregate NTM measures
In our preferred specification, the dependent variable is quantity- based TFP computed 
using the production function coefficients for the mono- product firm sample, estimated by 
Levin- sohn and Petrin (2003).12 Table 4 presents the main results. All regressions control for 
the firm size and have time, sub- industry and firm fixed effects. Column (1) reports a nega-
tive and significant effect of input NTM on productivity. A 1% increase in input NTM is 
associated with 1.2% lower TFP. We expect that input NTMs influence the productivity of 
importing firms more than they affect the productivity of non- importing firms. Adding an 
import control variable and an interaction of importing with input NTM in column (2) con-
firms this conjecture. For non- importing firms, a 1% increase in input NTM reduces pro-
ductivity by 0.8% and is not statistically significant; however, importers experience an 
additional 0.9% reduction (thus, 1.7% reduction in productivity). This difference is statisti-
cally significant. The absence of a significant effect on non- importers indicates that the re-
duction in NTMs has a direct impact on firms that use intermediate inputs, but does not 
spill over to the entire industry. Moreover, food companies that import are 25.5% more 
productive than non- importers. This finding is consistent with the heterogeneous firms 
model and fixed costs of importing, such that only the most productive firms find it profit-
able to import intermediate inputs. In column (3) we control for input tariffs. The effect of 
input NTMs on importers remains negative and significant, while the effect of input MFN 
tariffs is negative but not significant. In column (4) we control for the level of protection 
against foreign competition accorded to final goods by adding output NTM and output 
MFN controls. Both input and output NTMs have negative effects on productivity, while 
the effect of input MFNs on importers turns more negative and significant. The size of the 
 12We also estimated the regression with TFP based on the sample of multi- product firms. The results are similar and do not change 
our main conclusions. The results are available upon request.
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effect for variable input MFN is consistent with other findings in the literature— a 1% reduc-
tion in input MFN tariff is associated with a 1.8% increase in productivity. The difference 
between the coefficients of input MFNs in models (3) and (4) can be explained by an omitted 
variable bias, as output and input tariffs are correlated with each other. In column (5) we 
control for exporting status. Exporters are 11.3% more productive than non- exporters. This 
corresponds well with the theoretical model of Melitz (2003), which asserts that only the 
most productive firms are able to cover the fixed costs associated with expanding into the 
foreign market. This has also been confirmed in many other empirical studies (see, e.g., 
Bernard et al., 2003). Finally, in column (6) we use a one- year lag for our policy variables 
because they may have a delay in influence. This step also reduces endogeneity concerns. 
However, lagging the variables of interest does not change the sign, nor the significance 
levels of the coefficients of the variable of interest— the interaction of importing and input 
NTMs in fact turns more negative. Output NTMs and input tariffs also remain strongly 
negative and significant.
To sum up, applying NTMs to the imports of intermediate inputs significantly lowers a 
food- producing firm's productivity. This result is robust to controlling for the effect of tariffs 
on intermediate inputs and the effect of trade policy on final outputs.
TA B L E  4  Average NTM effect on productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Input NTM −1.213* −0.845 −0.832 0.812 0.897 1.406*
(0.55) (0.56) (0.60) (0.61) (0.62) (0.61)
Input NTM × Importer −0.911** −0.911** −0.979** −0.972** −1.630**
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.31)
Input MFN −0.019 −1.801** −1.935** −1.994**
(0.59) (0.65) (0.65) (0.55)
Output NTM −1.528** −1.577** −1.062**
(0.31) (0.31) (0.34)
Output MFN 0.084** 0.080** 0.049*
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024)
Importer = 1 0.255** 0.255** 0.264** 0.255** 0.443**
(0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079)
Exporter = 1 0.113** 0.103**
(0.022) (0.022)
ln(Employment) 0.016 0.011 0.011 0.007 −0.002 −0.030
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,093 10,093 10,093 10,093 10,093 9,207
R2 0.377 0.378 0.378 0.383 0.386 0.394
The dependent variable is the natural log of TFP estimated on the quantity- based sample of monoproduct firms using Levinsohn 
and Petrin’s (2003) method. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Model (6) uses a one year lagged values of all trade policy 
variables— input and output NTMs and MFNs.
+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01.
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TA B L E  6  NTM and tariff liberalisation and product characteristics
Sanit. Phyto Veter Ecolo Cert MFN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln (Output) −0.095* 0.002 −0.013 −0.013 0.018 0.003
(0.046) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.077) (0.0038)
Observations 662 662 662 662 662 662
R2 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
ln (Output) −0.094 −0.011 −0.013 −0.013 0.028 0.001
(0.050) (0.037) (0.027) (0.027) (0.096) (0.0048)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 662 662 662 662 662 662
R2 0.033 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.014
ln(Employment) −0.075 −0.014 −0.023 −0.023 0.064 0.000
(0.060) (0.034) (0.038) (0.038) (0.083) (0.0047)
Observations 662 662 662 662 662 662
R2 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
ln(Employment) −0.057 −0.026 −0.028 −0.028 0.086 0.001
(0.062) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.11) (0.0054)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 662 662 662 662 662 662
R2 0.030 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.014
ln(Number of 
firms)
−0.040 −0.004 −0.002 −0.002 0.029 0.000
(0.028) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.050) (0.0017)
Observations 662 662 662 662 662 662
R2 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ln(Number of 
firms)
−0.044 −0.012 −0.005 −0.005 0.041 0.000
(0.030) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.060) (0.0017)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 662 662 662 662 662 662




0.438 0.031 −0.206 −0.206 0.103 −0.016
(0.43) (0.13) (0.51) (0.51) (0.55) (0.019)
Observations 662 662 662 662 662 662




0.514 0.051 −0.203 −0.203 0.129 −0.014
(0.42) (0.13) (0.49) (0.49) (0.56) (0.018)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 662 662 662 662 662 662
R2 0.030 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.015
Each cell represents a separate regression of a 5- year change in NTM or MFN tariff in 2008– 2013 on the variable in the 
corresponding row. A unit of observation is an HS4 product, relevant variables are average output and employment of a firm, 
importing within HS4 product, number of firms and HHI index of concentration for firms importing HS4 product.
+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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6.2 | Alternative measures of productivity
We also consider different measures of productivity, including OP method and the Ackerberg- 
Caves- Frazer method (Ackerberg et al., 2015) applied to the Levinsohn– Petrin method of 
production function estimation (LP- ACF, see Levinsohn & Petrin, 2003). The results are pre-
sented in Table 5. We report TFP measured by the standard Levinsohn– Petrin method. In all 
cases, we estimate how NTMs influence revenue- and quantity- based TFP for mono- product 
firms. The results are relatively stable and consistent across all types of TFP: input NTMs 
have a negative effect on the productivity of importers when we measure productivity using 
a quantity- based production function. The effect is more pronounced for the quantity- based 
TFP measure because revenue- based TFP includes the positive effect of higher NTM protec-
tion on the prices of final goods, leading to a higher coefficient for input NTMs for all model 
specifications. Output NTM and tariff barriers to trade also tend to have a negative effect on 
firm productivity.
6.3 | Changes in trade policy and product characteristics
Trade policy is likely to be endogenous to trade structure and industry composition. For in-
stance, superstar firms accumulate economic resources and political capital that are com-
parable to or even exceed the resources available in many developing countries. Such firms 
successfully lobby for trade policy negotiations to incorporate low tariffs, lax labour standards 
and preferential tax regimes (Rodrik, 2018). The ability of firms and industries to influence 
trade policy depends on their economic size, political connections or degree of coordination, 
leading to a biased coefficient in a regression of productivity on NTM.
However, these concerns are greatly reduced when the analysis concerns firms in the devel-
oping and transition countries. Ukrainian firms do not appear on the list of superstar firms. 
They lack the resources to be able to influence the WTO negotiations between Ukraine and its 
trading partners such as the EU and the USA, who are much larger in size and are lobbying for 
the interests of their own industries.13 Nor were the Ukrainian food firms particularly well 
organised or coordinated, given that there were structural changes in the 1990s and 2000s, and 
the process of transitioning through these was not conducive to forming effective business as-
sociations. Frequent changes of government and the absence of adequately structured political 
parties did not offer firms fully functioning channels for lobbying for their economic interests. 
Therefore, trade policy changes are more likely to be exogenous.
This conjecture is confirmed by statistical analysis. Following Khandelwal and Topalova 
(2011), Movchan et al., (2020) present evidence that the trade policy changes in 2008– 2013 were 
not driven by lobbying by local firms. In this paper, we reproduce these findings and also 
present new evidence on the independence of the policy changes from food industry market 
structure and political weight. Table 6 presents the results. Each cell is a separate regression 
of a 5- year change in NTMs or MFN tariff in 2008– 2013 on the variable in the corresponding 
row. A unit of observation is an HS 4 product- year, the relevant variables are average output 
and employment, the number of firms, and the Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI) of con-
centration of firms importing within HS 4 products. Results are presented with and without 
sub- industry fixed effects. In all cases, with the exception of the significant negative effect of 
log output on sanitary measures, changes in the trade policy variables cannot be explained by 
economic size or coordination complexity, or measured by the number of firms or HHI degree 
 13Ukrainian oligarchs who represented extractive industries were much more politically active, but the food industry is more 
competitive and less politically connected.
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of concentration. Even in the case of sanitary measures, the impact of the economic size disap-
pears, once we control for sub- industry fixed effects.
We conclude that there is no evidence that the trade policy changes related to food process-
ing were driven by domestic industry lobbying. The Ukrainian WTO accession, which was the 
driving force of the changes to NTMs post- 2008, was primarily shaped by trade policy changes 
imposed by such economic superpowers as the EU and the USA, who were concerned that 
their multinational companies and financial industries could benefit from good market access 
and services liberalisation (Shepotylo & Vakhitov, 2015). This result is reassuring because we 
can treat changes in NTMs and tariffs as exogenous shocks to domestic firms in Ukraine.
In order to address any remaining concerns about the endogeneity of selection into import-
ers, we also consider regressions in 3- and 5- year differences. The results, which are presented 
in the Online Appendix, confirm that NTMs have a negative impact on productivity.
7 |  CONCLUSION A N D POLICY IM PLICATIONS
This paper argues that non- tariff measures applied to imported intermediate inputs lower the 
productivity of firms by restricting the variety of available imported inputs and distorting the 
efficient input mix toward domestic producers. We find that there is an overall negative effect 
of NTM on productivity— a 1% increase in NTM on imported inputs lowers the productivity 
of importing firms by 0.2%– 1.7%. Other instruments of trade policy, including input and out-
put tariffs and output NTMs, also tend to have negative effects on productivity.
The effect is heterogeneous and depends on the type of NTM. Using a unique database 
of sanitary, phytosanitary, veterinary, ecological and mandatory certification measures, we 
showed that sanitary and phytosanitary and ecological measures on imported inputs have 
a stronger negative effect on the productivity of those firms that used imported inputs more 
intensively prior to the episode of trade liberalisation in Ukraine in 2008– 2012. Importantly, 
we find that the effect of all types of NTMs on quantity- based productivity measures is always 
more negative than the effect of NTMs on revenue- based productivity. This is consistent with 
our prior expectations that firms respond to stricter NTM regulations by adjusting prices up-
wards to soften the impact of trade policy on their performance. It is also consistent with the 
previous findings in the literature about the differences in the performance of quantity- and 
revenue- based productivity measures (Foster et al., 2008; Syverson, 2004). This finding also 
highlights the importance of properly measuring productivity for trade policy analysis. Other 
trade policy variables, such as input and output tariffs and NTMs on outputs, also tend to have 
negative effects on productivity. This result shows the importance of controlling for the effects 
channelled through changes in prices when estimating the effects of policies on productivity. 
In terms of policy implications, our results show that the negative effect of imposing NTMs 
on productivity should be taken into account when policy makers consider a policy to address 
legitimate public concerns about food quality and safety.
These findings indicate that public health and safety is more efficiently protected through 
the control of outputs rather than through the introduction of non- tariff measures on inputs. 
Also, it is more efficient to regulate and ensure product quality and safety through the control 
of production process (e.g., HACCP) because the requirement to certify equipment is less det-
rimental to productivity than a requirement to implement SPS measures.
We also demonstrated the importance of careful estimation of the production function be-
cause the revenue- based TFP confounds the physical productivity and price measures of pro-
ductivity. NTMs have a consistently stronger negative effect on quantity- based TFP, while the 
effect on revenue- based TFP is attenuated by the change in price. This may be explained by the 
reaction of price and quality of output to changes in NTM. To analyse the effect on quality, 
more detailed data on imported inputs is required. We leave this question for further research.
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